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In the continuation of efforts to weaken United Nations (UN)-inspired economic sanctions against Iraq, 
the government of Saddam Hussein recently "induced" about 18,000 of its citizens to gather at the Iraqi 
border with Saudi Arabia. The proximal purpose was to demonstrate that UN economic sanctions had 
left Iraqis without the resources to make the hajj to Mecca. Without appropriate resources, the Saudis 
would have no choice but to say but to say "No." No resources, no hajj. Preventing Muslims from making 
the hajj--an obligation for any Muslim who is able--would in effect portray the sanctions as contributing 
to a sacrilege against God and would further decrease support for continuation of the sanctions among 
UN members. On the other hand, if the Saudis said, "Yes," it could only be in the context of funding the 
hajj-bound Iraqis by the UN freeing Iraqi financial assets that have been frozen through the sanctions. 
The Iraqi government assumed that the UN would not weaken the sanctions, so the incipient Saudi 
"Yes" could only become an actual "No". 
 
But the Saudis actually said, "Yes." The Iraqis were welcome and the Saudis would pay with Saudi funds. 
So, the Iraqis said, "No," and the 18,000 or so pilgrims--who by this time had entered Saudi Arabia--were 
"induced" by Iraqi authorities to return home. The subtext of the action had linked sacrilege with the 
Iraqi government. At a time of worldly adversity, Saddam Hussein has just provoked a very powerful 
enemy not of this world but simultaneously everywhere within it. (See Aune, R.K., Metts, S., & Ebesu 
Hubbard, A.S. (1998). Managing the outcomes of discovered deception. Journal of Social Psychology, 
138, 677-689; Bonetti, S. (1998). Experimental economics and deception. Journal of Economic 
Psychology, 19, 377-395; Burgoon, J.K., Buller, D.B., Floyd, K., & Grandpre, J. (1996). Deceptive realities: 
Sender, receiver, and observer perspectives in deceptive conversations. Communication Research, 23, 
724-748; Gillings, V., Joseph, S. (1996). Religiosity and social desirability: Impression management and 
self-deceptive positivity. Personality and Individual Differences, 21, 1047-1050; Millar, M.G., & Millar, K. 
(1997). Effects of situational variables on judgments about deception and detection accuracy. Basic and 
Applied Social Psychology, 19, 401-410; Pilgrims, going back to Iraq, fault Saudis. (March 25, 1999). The 
New York Times, p. A5.) (Keywords: Hajj, Iraq, Islam, Mecca, Muslims, Saddam Hussein, Saudi Arabia, 
UN, United Nations.) 
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